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The Human Rights Act and the Doctrine of Precedent 
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Conflicts between domestic precedents and subsequent decisions of the European Court of 
Human Rights have resulted in the lower courts following prior domestic decisions even 
when convinced that they will be overruled on appeal. The standard interpretation of the 
decision of the House of Lords in Kay v Lambeth holds the lower courts to domestic 
precedents that are manifestly inconsistent with the subsequent Strasbourg jurisprudence and 
admits only the most limited exception. This article advances an alternative approach to the 
relationship between the domestic courts’ obligations under the Human Rights Act 1998 and 
the doctrine of precedent by analysis of the nature of the doctrine of precedent and the 
reasons offered by Lord Bingham in his leading judgment in Kay. This analysis is then 
extended and applied to two recent cases in which the lower courts have considered 
themselves bound by a decision of the UK’s highest appeal court that fails to give due effect 
to the applicants’ Convention rights. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ‘speaks in abstract 
terms’1 and thereby leaves much scope for interpretation. The European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) has, for example, noted that the ‘the concept of “private life” [to which 
‘respect’ is to be given under Art 8(1)] is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive 
definition’. 2  It is therefore unsurprising that the interpretation given to some of the 
Convention rights by the domestic courts has, on occasion, diverged from that given by the 
ECtHR. There have, in particular, been a number of cases in which the domestic courts have 
adopted a noticeably narrower interpretation of the concept of private life to that 
subsequently adopted by the ECtHR.
3
 This raises questions about the operation of the 
domestic rules of precedent with regard to the Convention rights given domestic effect by the 
Human Rights Act 1998. The central question, according to Lord Bingham in a 2006 decision 
of the House of Lords, is ‘whether a court which would ordinarily be bound to follow the 
decision of another court higher in the domestic curial hierarchy is, or should be, no longer 
bound to follow that decision if it appears to be inconsistent with a later ruling of the court in 
Strasbourg’.4 This phrasing implies a context in which domestic precedents are generally 
binding on the lower courts, thereby restricting discussion to whether the 1998 Act permits 
departure from what would otherwise be a duty of strict adherence. 
                                                 
*
  I am grateful to those who have read and commented on earlier drafts of this paper, particularly Deryck 
Beyleveld, Fiona de Londras, Roger Masterman and the two anonymous reviewers. All errors are mine. 
1
  R Dworkin Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996) p 358. 
2
  Pretty v UK (2346/02) (2002) 35 EHRR 1 at [61]. 
3
  Cf eg R (Pretty) v DPP [2001] UKHL 61 with ibid; and R (S and Marper) v Chief Constable of the 
South Yorkshire Police [2004] UKHL 39 with S & Marper v UK (30562/04 and 30566/04) (2009) 48 
EHRR 50. 
4
   Kay v Lambeth LBC; Leeds CC v Price [2006] UKHL 10 at [40]. 
 Whether or not we accept this starting point, and this paper will not, the 1998 Act 
does not expressly address the situation where there is a conflict between a domestic 
precedent and the later jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Section 6(1) makes it unlawful for the 
domestic courts, as public authorities, to act in a way that is incompatible with the 
Convention rights specified in s 1(1). Section 2(1) requires domestic courts to take account of 
any relevant Strasbourg judgment or opinion when determining a question in connection with 
these rights. But the effect of these two interconnected duties on the force of domestic 
precedents is not specifically addressed. In the period since the House of Lords purported to 
authoritatively rule on Lord Bingham’s question, there has been surprisingly little academic 
discussion of this specific issue,
5
 as opposed to the general affect of s 2(1).
6
 
Lord Bingham’s own answer in Kay v Lambeth LBC; Leeds CC v Price supported 
continued adherence to a ‘binding domestic decision’, while recognising that there was at 
least a ‘partial exception’ to this general ‘rule’. 7  As will be shown in the next section, 
subsequent decisions have interpreted and applied this ruling in its most restrictive sense, 
considering it a strict rule with an exception limited to the ‘exceptional’ facts of a particular 
case.
8
 
The purpose of this paper is to advance an alternative view on the proper approach of 
the domestic courts when faced with the situation where a domestic precedent adopts a 
narrow interpretation of a Convention right that is inconsistent with a later Strasbourg 
decision. It will be argued that the restrictive reading of Lord Bingham’s reasoning 
mistakenly treats domestic precedents as strictly binding, puts applicants in a weak position 
in the lower courts relative to the likely outcome of a later appeal, and is not supported by the 
two reasons given by Lord Bingham in Kay. In particular, it will be argued that there can be 
no more than a strong rebuttable presumption that a domestic precedent will be followed, and 
Lord Bingham’s reasoning supports rebuttal of this presumption in circumstances beyond the 
facts of the case specifically approved by his Lordship. Further, the approach of the courts in 
two more recent cases
9
 will be challenged and it will be argued that these are examples of 
cases involving the proper interpretation of Art 8(1) in which it is proper and appropriate for 
the lower courts to depart from a domestic precedent to give effect to a single decision of the 
ECtHR. 
 
                                                 
5
  There are some examples, such as I Leigh and R Masterman Making Rights Real (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2008) pp.71–75 and AL Young ‘Precedent’ in D Hoffman (ed) The Impact of the UK 
Human Rights Act on Private Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) p 91 esp at 102–
105. There are also various case notes, including eg S Bright ‘Article 8 again in the House of Lords: 
Kay v Lambeth LBC; Leeds CC v’ Price’ (2006) Con 294, 307–308 and S Foster ‘To follow the 
Supreme Court or Strasbourg? Judicial precedent and the Human Rights Act 1998’ (2010) 15 2) 
Coventry LJ 33. 
6
  See eg R Masterman ‘Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998: binding domestic courts to 
Strasbourg?’ (2004) PL 725; J Lewis ‘The European ceiling on human rights’ (2007) PL 720; J Wright 
‘Interpreting section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998: towards an indigenous jurisprudence of human 
rights’ (2009) PL 595; A Kavanagh Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 146–152, F Klug and H Wildbore ‘Follow or lead? 
The Human Rights Act and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 6 EHRLR 621 and B 
Malkani ‘A rights-specific approach to section 2 of the Human Rights Act’ (2012) 5 EHRLR 516. 
7
  [2006] UKHL 10 at [40]–[45]. 
8
  Lord Bingham had approved the Court of Appeal’s approach in D v East Berkshire Community NHS 
Trust [2003] EWCA Civ 1151. 
9
  R (Purdy) v DPP [2008] EWHC 2565; [2009] EWCA Civ 92; [2009] UKHL 45 and GC & C v 
Commission of Police for the Metropolis [2010] EWHC 2225; [2011] UKSC 21. 
2. SUBSEQUENT OSSIFICATION OF KAY V LAMBETH 
 
Lord Bingham’s decision in Kay was supported by a seven-member panel of the House of 
Lords.
10
 His Lordship concluded that, even in the Convention context, the lower courts 
should ordinarily adhere to the domestic rules of precedent and follow a ‘binding domestic 
decision’. His Lordship recognised a ‘partial exception’ to this general rule, but did not define 
that exception beyond approving D v East Berkshire Community NHS Trust.
11
 
In East Berkshire, the Court of Appeal declined to follow the decision of the House of 
Lords in X v Bedfordshire
12
 and instead gave effect to the later decision of the ECtHR in Z v 
UK.
13
  These cases involving the alleged negligence of public bodies when dealing with 
actual and suspected child abuse. Lord Bingham supported the Court of Appeal’s decision not 
to follow Bedfordshire by referring to three features of the case. First, he noted that the policy 
considerations underlying the decision to strike out the claim in negligence in the precedent 
had been ‘very largely eroded’. Secondly, Bedfordshire had been decided before the 1998 
Act and had not made reference to the Convention in its opinions. Thirdly and 
 
importantly, the very children whose claim in negligence the House had rejected [in X v 
Bedfordshire] as unarguable succeeded at Strasbourg [in Z v UK] in establishing a breach of 
article 3 of the Convention and recovering what was, by Strasbourg standards, very 
substantial reparation.
14 
 
Lord Bingham added that, given the restrictions on the lower courts’ ability to depart 
from a precedent, the duty imposed on the lower court by the 1998 Act was primarily to 
review the Convention arguments put to them and, where possible conflicts arise, ‘they may 
express their views and give leave to appeal’ and leapfrog appeals ‘may be appropriate’. 
In the subsequent case of R (RJM) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Lord 
Neuberger (with the agreement of the other law lords) opined: 
 
Where the Court of Appeal considers that an earlier decision of this House, which would 
otherwise be binding on it, may be, or even is clearly, inconsistent with a subsequent decision 
of the ECtHR, then (absent wholly exceptional circumstances) the court should faithfully 
follow the decision of the House, and leave it to your Lordships to decide whether to modify 
or reverse its earlier decision. To hold otherwise would be to go against what Lord Bingham 
decided.
15
 
 
The situation is different, Lord Neuberger added, where the Court of Appeal is faced with a 
conflict between one of its own decisions and an inconsistent subsequent decision of the 
ECtHR. His Lordship reasoned that under the ordinary rules of precedent the Court of Appeal 
is ‘freer to depart from its earlier decisions’ than those of the UK’s highest court and the law 
of precedent could therefore be developed in a ‘principled and cautious fashion’ to permit 
(but not oblige) the Court of Appeal to give domestic effect to the Strasbourg decision.
16
 This 
decision thus upholds the idea that appeal court decisions remain binding on the lower courts 
save for ‘wholly exceptional circumstances’. 
                                                 
10
  [2006] UKHL 10 at [40]–[45]. 
11
  [2004] QB 558. 
12
  [1995] 2 AC 633 
13
  (2001) 34 EHRR 97. 
14
  [2006] UKHL 10 at [45]. 
15
  [2008] UKHL 63 at [64]. 
16
  Ibid, [65]–[66]. 
This was the approach of the Divisional Court in Purdy, which considered itself 
bound by decisions of the highest appeal court, holding that the exception recognised in Kay 
is ‘a very limited one that will apply only in the most exceptional circumstances’.17 The 
Divisional Court in GC & C also followed an earlier domestic precedent, declaring ‘this court 
is bound by the decision of the House of Lords’ and D v East Berkshire represents a ‘single 
exception…miles away from this case’.18 In these cases, which will be examined in depth in 
section 5, the appeal courts supported the Divisional Court’s approach to precedent. Since 
Kay, appeal court precedents on the meaning of a Convention right have been consistently 
followed in preference to later Strasbourg jurisprudence.
19
 
 The next section of this paper will examine the doctrine of precedent and its operation 
in the context of human rights. This will be followed by section 4, which analyses the actual 
reasoning of Lord Bingham in Kay v Lambeth. 
 
3. THE DOCTRINE OF PRECEDENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
It is often noted that the doctrine of stare decisis is ‘a cornerstone of our legal system’20 and 
‘is woven into the essential fabric of the common law’. 21  This doctrine is classically 
expressed as the norm that the precedents set by the appeal courts bind the lower courts.
22
  
Formally, all the courts below the Supreme Court are regarded as bound by its decisions (and 
those of the House of Lords) and the decisions of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales 
bind the court itself (with narrow exceptions)
23
 and all courts below. But is this view of 
precedent accurate or justifiable? 
 Even the most cursory perusal of the case law reveals repeated repetition of the view 
that precedents are binding, often explicitly expressed using the language of ‘binding 
authority’ or ‘binding precedent’.24 The case law is similarly replete with the associated 
language of following, distinguishing, and separating the ratio decidendi from obiter dicta. 
That is not to say that there are not cases where a judge has knowingly departed from a 
precedent of a superior court without distinguishing it, but such cases are exceptional.
25
 There 
are, in particular, cases in which Privy Council decisions have been vested with more than 
their formal status as ‘persuasive’ authorities and followed in preference to a formally 
‘binding’ decision of an appeal court. The Privy Council’s decision in the Wagon Mound on 
the test for remoteness in negligence was, for example, regarded by the Court of Appeal as 
displacing its own decision in re Polemis.
26
 Similarly, the Court of Appeal in James and 
Karimi explicitly followed a decision of the Privy Council on provocation in preference to an 
                                                 
17
  [2008] EWHC 2565 at [45]. 
18
  [2010] EWHC 2225 at [32]. 
19
  For a recent example, see R (Kaiyam) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] EWCA Civ 1587, esp at 
[5]. 
20
  E.g. [2006] UKHL 10 at [42] (Lord Bingham). 
21
  B V Harris ‘Final Appellate Courts Overruling their Own “Wrong” Precedents: The Ongoing Search 
for Principle’ (2002) 118 LQR 408, 412. 
22
  N Duxbury The Nature and Authority of Precedent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) p 
12. 
23
  David v Johnson [1979] AC 264, 324 and 328, and RJM [2008] UKHL 63. 
24
  See eg statements to this effect in the Supreme Court: Geys v Société Générale [2012] UKSC 63 at [93] 
and [141], and Mills v HSBC Trustee [2011] UKSC 48 at [40]. 
25
  See eg the discussion of the lower courts’ approach to Re F [1990] 2 AC 1 in SD Pattinson Medical 
Law and Ethics (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) pp 67– 68. 
26
  See the discussion of The Wagon Mound [1961] AC 388 and re Polemis [1921] 3 KB 560 in Smith v 
Leech Brain [1962] 2 QB 405, 415. 
earlier decision of the House of Lords of less than 5 years’ standing.27 The Court of Appeal’s 
decision, which has itself been followed,
28
 did not even attempt to distinguish the earlier 
decision of the House of Lords. Instead, it noted that the Privy Council’s panel of nine of the 
Lords of Appeal in Ordinary had agreed that the House of Lords’ decision was incorrectly 
decided and opined that the circumstances were such that ‘the result of any appeal on the 
issue to the House of Lords is a foregone conclusion’.29 
The exceptional nature of cases in which the lower courts have explicitly decided not 
to follow a precedent speaks to the respect given to stare decisis. As Allen pointed out as far 
back as 1925, 
 
The ‘binding force’ of precedents has, through constant and often unthinking repetition, 
become a kind of sacramental phrase which contains a large element of fiction.
30 
 
Indeed, it is apparent that precedents are not regarded as having the same authoritative force 
as statutes. But neither are they ignored by the lower courts; rather they are treated as 
carrying significant persuasive force within the common law system. Imbuing precedents 
with anything more than significant presumptive authority would raise insurmountable 
justificatory problems. As Duxbury has argued, no single principle or theory can explain or 
justify the formally asserted strict bindingness of precedent.
31
 The best that we have, he has 
argued, is a number of arguments that require ‘not an unassailable but a strong rebuttable 
presumption that earlier decisions be followed’.32  
 Some of the arguments supporting the authority of precedent are consequentialist in 
the sense of appealing to the predicted effects of adherence to past decisions, such as 
arguments that following precedent saves the time and effort of repeatedly working through 
the same points, generates legal stability, facilitates certainty and predictability, and curbs 
arbitrary judicial discretion. But these outcomes are not guaranteed by following a precedent: 
it could take greater time to work through conflicting precedents than deciding afresh and the 
discretion inherent in identifying rationes decidendi means that the results are not invariably 
stable, certain or predictable.
33
 There is a further issue of whether the consequences of 
precedent-following are important enough to outweigh any injustice arising from following a 
precedent. The support given to precedent-following by consequentialist justifications is not 
absolute, because departing from a precedent will often have benefits and the weight attached 
to a particular consequence needs to be weighed against competing values. 
Arguments advanced on deontological grounds, in the sense of appealing to a reason 
held out as an intrinsic good, fare no better as attempts to justify strict adherence to 
precedent. Supporting a decision that comes first in time is simply not an intrinsic good; what 
is worth honouring is what is good about the past, not the past as such. The formal justice of 
treating like cases alike does not require stare decisis – in fact, formal justice predates it34 – 
and does not decisively assist in a world in which no two cases are truly alike in every 
respect.
35
 Thus, agreeing with Duxbury, formal justice needs to operate alongside substantive 
                                                 
27
  R v James and Karimi [2006] EWCA Crim 14 following Attorney General for Jersey v Holley [2005] 
UKPC 23 and refusing to follow R v Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146. 
28
  R v Moses [2006] EWCA Crim 1721. 
29
  [2006] EWCA Crim 14 at [43]. 
30
  C K Allen ‘Precedent and logic’ (1925) 41 LQR 329, 334. 
31
  Duxbury, n 22 above. 
32
  Ibid, p 183. 
33
  See E Maltz ‘The Nature of Precedent’ (1988) 66 NCL Review 367 and Duxbury, above n 22, ch 3. 
34
  See eg Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, transl. by Roger Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000) book V 
35
  See further P Westen ‘The empty idea of equality’ (1982) 95 Harv L Rev 537. 
justice, so that the underlying principle is surely that ‘like cases should be treated alike except 
where doing so repeats an injustice’.36 
If we accept that no case for precedent-following is water-tight and the value of 
precedent rests with its capacity to simultaneously constrain and allow a degree of 
discretion,
37
 then we must conclude that precedents are no more than strong rebuttable 
presumptions. This conclusion is relevant – indeed, especially relevant – when the precedents 
in question concern the ambit of human rights to which the lower courts are statutorily bound 
to give effect. The authority of domestic precedents must also be considered in the light of 
the statutory requirement in s 2 of the 1998 Act that the courts ‘take into account’ the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence when giving effect to the Convention rights. If a decision of a 
domestic appeal court is not properly considered strictly binding, then an earlier domestic 
decision cannot be properly treated as if it were a statutory bar to giving effect to a later 
Strasbourg decision. Further, no court – not even the highest domestic appeal court – may 
increase the precedential authority of its own decisions because any ruling that it makes must 
itself be subject to the limits of precedent. Thus, it remains open to the lower courts to decline 
to follow a precedent where it considers an alternative approach to have a stronger 
justification or carry greater authority. 
 
Precedent and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
 
But is it appropriate for a domestic court to give effect to a decision of the ECtHR when the 
Strasbourg court does not even give lip service to the idea that its precedents are binding? 
Article 46 of the Convention requires no more than States ‘abide by the final judgment of the 
Court in any case where they are parties’. In Cossey, the ECtHR declared that it ‘is not bound 
by its previous judgments’, but ‘it usually follows and applies its own precedents, such a 
course being in the interests of legal certainty and the orderly development of the Convention 
case law’.38 The court went on to state that it is able to depart from an earlier decision where 
‘there were cogent reasons for doing so’, such as ‘to ensure that the interpretation of the 
Convention reflects societal changes and remains in line with present day conditions’.39 In 
Goodwin v UK, the Grand Chamber exercised its freedom to depart from previous decisions 
of the ECtHR by reversing the actual decision in Cossey on the effect of the Convention 
rights on the legal status of transsexuals. In the process, it quoted another ECtHR decision for 
the view that ‘it is in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law 
that it should not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases’ 
and such reasons included having regard ‘to the changing conditions in Contracting States 
and respond, for example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved’.40 
Thus, although the ECtHR does not formally accept stare decisis, it does accept that 
its precedents have some authority on the basis of the consequentialist concerns of certainty, 
foreseeability and stability, and the deontological concern of equality before the law. The 
example given and applied in Goodwin of a sufficient justification for departing from a 
precedent reinforces the view that the Convention is a ‘living instrument’. 41  This view 
recognises that more recent decisions of the Strasbourg court generally have greater authority 
than older decisions. It is also widely recognised that the weight and influence of any judicial 
                                                 
36
  Duxbury, above n 22, p 177. 
37
  Ibid, pp 181–182. 
38
  Cossey v UK (10843/84) (1991) 13 EHRR 622 at [35]. 
39
  Ibid. 
40
  Goodwin v UK (2002) (28957/95) (2002) 35 EHRR 18 at [74], citing Chapman v UK (27238/94) 
(2001) 33 EHRR 18 at [70]. 
41
  Tyrer v UK (1978) 2 EHRR 1 at [31]. 
pronouncement of the Court will also turn on ‘the level of generality at which it is expressed 
or its centrality to the decision on the material facts’, and a Grand Chamber decision is 
generally considered more authoritative than one by a Court Chamber.
42
 
The UK courts need not, however, adopt the Strasbourg court’s approach to its own 
decisions. As will be shown presently, the approach of the UK’s highest court to the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence under s 2 of the 1998 Act has generally been to consider the 
ECtHR’s decisions to be sufficiently authoritative to give rise to a strong presumption that 
they will be followed. According to Masterman, the practice has been that ‘the relevant 
Strasbourg jurisprudence is followed in all but the most extreme circumstances – a position 
which comes close to the domestic courts being bound to follow the Convention case law’.43 
The highpoint of this approach is represented by Lord Bingham’s declaration in Ullah: the 
‘duty of national courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over 
time: no more, but certainly no less’.44  
The Ullah or ‘mirror’ principle involves the domestic courts ordinarily following ‘any 
clear and constant’ jurisprudence of the ECtHR45  and any contemporary decision of the 
Grand Chamber.
46
 It is a qualified mirror principle. In Alconbury, Lord Slynn recognised an 
exception in ‘special circumstances’.47 In particular, according to Lord Phillips in Horncastle, 
a domestic court may decline to follow Strasbourg if it doubts that ‘the Strasbourg court 
sufficiently appreciates or accommodates particular aspects of our domestic process’ to 
enable the Strasbourg court to reconsider and establish a ‘valuable dialogue’.48 Examples of 
cases where the Strasbourg court has displayed such misunderstandings are rare. One 
example is Osman v UK,
49
 which the ECtHR itself later accepted ‘was based on an 
understanding of the law of negligence which has to be reviewed in the light of the 
clarifications subsequently made by the domestic courts’.50 Another example is Morris v 
UK,
51
 which the House of Lords declined to follow in R v Spear and opined that the 
Strasbourg court would have appreciated the relevant rules ‘had the position been more fully 
explained’.52 Neither of these examples were decisions of the Grand Chamber nor part of a 
clear and constant line of cases. 
The approach of the UK’s highest appeal court to the Strasbourg jurisprudence has 
not gone without criticism.
53
 Laws LJ in the Court of Appeal has notably expressed a firm 
‘hope’ that the Ullah principle will be revisited by the Supreme Court to allow the domestic 
courts greater freedom to develop 
 
                                                 
42
  D J Harris, et al Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick Law of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) p 17. 
43
  Masterman, above n 6, at 727. 
44
  R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] UKHL 26 at [20] 
45
  R (Alconbury) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] UKHL 23 at 
[26], Ullah [2004] UKHL 26 at [20] and Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45 at [48]. 
46
  R (Anderson) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKHL 46 at [18] and Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v AF [2009] UKHL 28 at [70] (Lord Hoffman) at [108] (Lord 
Carswell), and [114] (Lord Brown) and Cadder v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 43 at [45]–[46] (Lord 
Hope). 
47
  Alconbury [2001] UKHL 23 at [26]. 
48
  R v Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14 at [11] (Lord Phillips with the agreement of the other members of the 
SC).  
49
  Osman v UK (23452/94) (2000) 29 EHRR 245. 
50
  Z v UK (29392/95) (2002) 34 EHRR 3 at [100]. 
51
  (38784/97) (2002) 34 EHRR 52 (see also the subsequent Grand Chamber decision: Cooper v UK 
(48843/99) (2004) 39 EHRR 8. 
52
  R v Spear [2002] UKHL 31, esp at [12], [29], [66] and [97]. 
53
   See n. 6 above. 
a municipal jurisprudence of the Convention rights, which the Strasbourg court should respect 
out of its own doctrine of the margin of appreciation, and which would be perfectly consistent 
with our duty to take account of (not to follow) the Strasbourg cases.
54
  
 
His Lordship expressed this view while explicitly declaring the Court of Appeal to be 
‘bound’ by the Ullah principle on the basis that it has been repeatedly affirmed by the House 
of Lords and Supreme Court.
55
 
One particularly powerful criticism of the Ullah principle is that it treats ECtHR 
decisions as setting a ‘ceiling’ on the Convention rights, as opposed to simply using the 
jurisprudence to set a ‘floor of rights’. Strasbourg could find a State in breach of the 
Convention if it fails to protect the minimum content of an individual’s Convention right, but 
not if the State chooses to grant individuals greater rights against public bodies than it is 
strictly required to do on the ECtHR’s interpretation of the Convention rights. Neither the 
government during the passing of the Act
56
 nor the Strasbourg organs had envisaged ECtHR 
decisions preventing the domestic courts adopting greater protection.
57
  
As Dickson has argued, the goal of the Ullah principle – promoting a uniform 
interpretation of the Convention in all Party States – ‘should be an important goal only in 
situations where what is at stake is the core of a Convention right, that is, the minimum 
protection which is to be guaranteed by it’.58 Uniformity is required in those situations to 
protect against fundamentally different interpretations of the Convention rights throughout 
Europe, 
 
But in other situations, such as where a balance needs to be struck between two conflicting 
Convention rights or between a Convention right and the interests of society or ‘the rights of 
others’, it is perfectly acceptable for a State to protect a Convention right to a greater extent 
than the required minimum, provided that in doing so it does not cease to protect one or more 
of the other Convention rights to the required minimum.
59
  
 
Dickson goes on to point out that the acceptability of States granting more extensive 
protection is recognised by both the Convention and the ECtHR. First, certain Convention 
rights are to be protected ‘in accordance with the law’ or ‘lawfully’, which means that States 
need to comply with any higher standards adopted by their national law if they are to avoid a 
finding that they have violated the relevant Convention right. Secondly, Art 53 of the 
Convention expressly states that it should not be construed as limiting any human rights and 
fundamental freedoms ensured under the laws of any party to the Convention.  
 In the light of these arguments, this paper does not seek to use the Ullah principle to 
support the Strasbourg jurisprudence being used to impose a ceiling on the Convention rights. 
Indeed, the argument advanced in section 5 is expressly limited to the situation where the 
later Strasbourg jurisprudence seeks to define the scope of a Convention right so as to delimit 
the minimum protection that is to be guaranteed by it. 
Another criticism of the Ullah principle is that it is undermined by the willingness of 
the highest appeal court to find exceptions to it. Masterman has listed 13 exceptions derived 
                                                 
54
  R (Children’s Rights Alliance for England) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] EWCA Civ 34 at 
[64]. 
55
  Citing R (Al-Skeini and others) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26 at [105], [106]; 
Ambrose v Harris (Procurator Fiscal, Oban) [2011] UKSC 43 at [19], [20], [86]. 
56
  Hansard, HL Deb vol 583 col 510, 18 November 1997. 
57
  See Masterman, n 6 above, esp 729–730. 
58
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from a ‘non-exhaustive (and highly-simplified) survey of the case-law’. 60  With respect, 
treating the approach of Alconbury (which supports departure from the mirror principle in 
‘special circumstances’), Horncastle (which supports departure from the mirror principle 
where the Strasbourg court has misunderstood domestic law or process) and other such cases 
as appealing to separate exceptions is uncharitable. Such an approach presents the mirror 
principle as riddled with unprincipled ad hoc exceptions. An alternative interpretation is that 
all the exceptions are instances of ‘special circumstances’, understood as those circumstances 
where it is appropriate and feasible to persuade the ECtHR to depart from its previous 
approach. Thus, Horncastle does not present an alternative exception to Alconbury; it 
instantiates that exception. This interpretation is, it is submitted, consistent with the recent 
decision of the Supreme Court on section 2(1) of the 1998 Act, issued in October 2013.
61 
In Chester, the Supreme Court gave domestic effect to Strasbourg decisions rejecting 
a general ban on convicted prisoners being permitted to vote. Lord Mance’s leading 
judgment
62
 cited with approval the view that deference to Strasbourg was limited by the need 
for what Lord Phillips in Horncastle described as ‘valuable dialogue’ and what Lord 
Neuberger in Pinnock described as ‘constructive dialogue’ between the domestic courts and 
Strasbourg.
63
 His Lordship added:  
 
But there are limits to this process, particularly where the matter has been already to a Grand 
Chamber once or, even more so, as in this case, twice. It would have then to involve some 
truly fundamental principle of our law or some most egregious oversight or misunderstanding 
before it could be appropriate for this court to contemplate an outright refusal to follow 
Strasbourg authority at the Grand Chamber level.
64
 
 
Lord Sumption, in a concurring judgment with which Lord Hughes agreed, added that the 
words ‘take into account’ in section 2(1) in ordinary English mean no more than consider a 
decision of the ECtHR and are compatible with rejecting it as wrong, but ‘this is not an 
approach that a United Kingdom court can adopt, save in altogether exceptional cases’.65 His 
Lordship considered that the domestic courts are ‘bound’ to treat decisions of the Strasbourg 
court 
 
as the authoritative expositions of the Convention which the Convention intends them to be, 
unless it is apparent that it has misunderstood or overlooked some significant feature of 
English law or practice which may, when properly explained, lead to the decision being 
reviewed by the Strasbourg court.
66
 
 
To sum up, the above analysis supports two propositions. First, the lower courts are not 
strictly bound by the decisions of the domestic appeal courts. Secondly, the UK’s highest 
appeal court has generally treated decisions of the Strasbourg court on matters of principle as 
authoritative. Indeed, the level of respect given to the decisions of the Strasbourg court has 
often been of a similar type to that which it grants to its own decisions,
67
 in terms of the level 
                                                 
60
  R Masterman ‘The Mirror Crack’d’, available at http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2013/02/13/roger-
masterman-the-mirror-crackd/ (accessed 1/1/14). 
61
  R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 63. 
62
  Lords Hope, Hughes and Kerr simply agreed, and Lords Clarke and Sumption agreed while adding 
reasons of their own: [2013] UKSC 63, [105] and [112]. 
63
  [2013] UKSC 63, [25]–[26], citing R v Horncastle [2009] UKSC 14, [11] and Manchester City Council 
v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [48].  
64
  [2013] UKSC 63, [27]. 
65
  [2013] UKSC 63, [121]. 
66
  Ibid. 
67
  Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234. 
of reluctance displayed in relation to departing from such decisions. These two propositions 
are directly relevant to the proper interpretation to be given to s 2(1) when faced with 
inconsistency between a domestic precedent and a later decision of the ECtHR. 
 
4. THE APPROACH TO PRECEDENT IN KAY V LAMBETH 
 
We saw above that Lord Bingham in Kay concluded that domestic precedents remain 
‘binding’ in a Convention context with a ‘partial exception’, and subsequent decisions have 
interpreted and applied this ‘rule’ so as to treat East Berkshire as representing an extremely 
limited exception. This approach is difficult to reconcile with the above analysis of the 
doctrine of stare decisis and the general approach of the domestic courts to Strasbourg 
jurisprudence. This section seeks to analyse his Lordship’s reasoning and show that it implies 
far more flexibility than recognised by subsequent decisions. 
 Lord Bingham’s reasons were prefaced by citation of the 1966 Practice Statement to 
the effect that adherence to precedent ‘provides at least some degree of certainty upon which 
individuals can rely in the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development 
of legal rules’.68 These are examples of the consequentialist arguments examined above and 
shown to justify no more than a strong rebuttable presumption in favour of following a 
precedent. No stronger justification was needed for the purpose of the Practice Statement, 
because it sought to make it clear that the House of Lords was not formally bound by its own 
decisions. The Lord Chancellor declared that the House would treat its own past decisions as 
‘normally binding’, but would henceforth explicitly ‘depart from a previous decision when it 
appears right to do so’.69 
The consequentialist concerns quoted by Lord Bingham were used to underpin the 
first of the two reasons offered for the conclusion that the duties imposed by the 1998 Act do 
not generally require or permit the lower courts to set aside an otherwise ‘binding’ precedent 
on the basis of an apparent inconsistency with a subsequent decision of the ECtHR. First, his 
Lordship opined, a rule permitting departure on the basis of a finding of clear inconsistency 
between the domestic precedent and the Strasbourg decision could produce inconsistency and 
uncertainty, and thereby undermine the certainty established by the doctrine of precedent. 
Secondly, adherence to the domestic rule of precedent supports ‘constructive collaboration’ 
between the Strasbourg court and the national courts. The second of these reasons was 
offered as the ‘more fundamental’. Both reasons must be considered consistent with Lord 
Bingham’s recognition of an exception to the general retention of the traditional rules of 
precedent. It is my contention that his Lordship’s reasoning implies a wider exception than a 
literal reading of the summary of the ‘extreme facts’70 of D v East Berkshire CC would 
suggest. 
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A. Clear inconsistency 
 
When articulating the first of his two reasons, Lord Bingham stated that the appeals before 
the court ‘illustrate the potential pitfalls of a rule based on a finding of clear inconsistency’.71 
His Lordship noted that a finding of clear inconsistency had been made by one but not the 
other of the two Court of Appeal decisions before it and their Lordships were themselves 
divided on whether there was a clear inconsistency. According to Lord Bingham: 
 
The prospect arises of different county court and High Court judges, and even different 
divisions of the Court of Appeal, taking differing views of the same issue. As Lord Hailsham 
observed ([1972] AC 1027, 1054), ‘in legal matters, some degree of certainty is at least as 
valuable a part of justice as perfection’. That degree of certainty is best achieved by adhering, 
even in the Convention context, to our rules of precedent.
72
 
 
Thus, a rule based on a finding of clear inconsistency would raise the ‘prospect’ of the lower 
courts ‘taking differing views of the same issue’, which would not provide the level of 
certainty in legal matters that is provided by adherence to the standard rules of precedent.  
It is a trite point to note that the standard rules of precedent provide no guarantee of 
certainty or predictability, because, even when properly applied, they grant significant 
interpretative discretion to judges. Lord Bingham’s claim, however, is merely that they offer 
‘some degree of certainty’. Nonetheless, this first reason only supports adherence to the 
standard rules of precedent where such adherence provides at least the same level of legal 
certainty as would follow were the lower courts free to depart from a domestic precedent to 
give effect to a subsequent Strasbourg decision. This is significant because there are cases in 
which a finding of clear inconsistency can be predicted with at least as much certainty as a 
finding that the domestic precedent applies to the instant facts and supports a particular 
conclusion. Indeed, in some cases the standard rules of jurisprudential interpretation, which 
underpin the doctrine of precedent, would not permit any reasonable alternative to the 
conclusion that the domestic precedent is inconsistent with a subsequent Strasbourg case. 
We need not look far for an example of a case in which it could be predicted with 
sufficient certainty that the domestic precedent is inconsistent with the subsequent Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, because Lord Bingham provided one by endorsing the Court of Appeal’s 
decision in East Berkshire to depart from the Bedfordshire case, as considered above. This 
implies that it could be predicted with sufficient certainty that the courts would consider the 
Bedfordshire case to be inconsistent with the subsequent Strasbourg jurisprudence. If this 
were not so, then establishing clear inconsistency would not even be a necessary condition 
for departing from a domestic precedent to give effect to subsequent Strasbourg 
jurisprudence; whereas Lord Bingham’s objection to a rule relying on establishing clear 
inconsistency alone is that it could not be sufficient if the requisite standard of certainty is to 
be maintained. Lord Bingham himself provided a compelling reason for believing 
Bedfordshire to be inconsistent with a subsequent decision of the Strasbourg court, namely, 
that the very children whose claim in negligence in the House of Lords had failed (on the 
basis of the absence of a duty of care) succeeded in establishing a breach of Art 3 of the 
ECHR (the right to be free from inhuman or degrading treatment) in Strasbourg.
73
 
In Kay itself, the mooted inconsistency was between the decision of the House of 
Lords in Harrow LBC v Qazi
74
 and the later decision of the ECtHR in Connors v UK.
75
 But 
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establishing an inconsistency between Qazi and Connors was not clear-cut and could 
defensibly give rise to differences of opinion. In contrast to the cases considered in East 
Berkshire, Qazi and Connors had involved different applicants and different facts. Indeed, Mr 
Qazi’s own application to the Strasbourg court had been dismissed as inadmissible76 and Qazi 
is not even mentioned in the judgment of the ECtHR in Connors. Further, the reasoning of 
the ECtHR in Connors left some room for the view that Qazi was distinguishable.  
Both Qazi and Connors concerned occupiers who sought to rely on their Art 8 right to 
‘respect’ for their ‘home’ to challenge a public authority landlord’s exercise of its right to 
possession under domestic property law. Mr Qazi had sought to remain in a local authority 
property after the joint tenancy that he had with his wife had come to an end. A three-to-two 
majority in Qazi held that Mr Qazi could not rely on Art 8 to defeat the local authority’s 
unqualified right to possession under domestic property law (variously reasoning that either 
the local authority’s right in domestic law to possession meant that there was no infringement 
of his right to ‘respect’ for his home under Art 8(1) or the balancing exercise under Art 8(2) 
would inevitably be determined in the local authority’s favour).77 In Connors, the ECtHR 
found there had been a violation of Art 8 when a gypsy family had been evicted from 
property that they had occupied for most of the preceding 16 years, even though the family 
had no right to occupy the property in domestic law. The ECtHR’s reasoning in Connors had 
placed some emphasis on the positive obligation owed by the State to the Connors family as 
members of a vulnerable minority; that is, gypsies.
78
 This raised the prospect of 
distinguishing the case on that basis. The Court of Appeal in Kay held that there was no 
inconsistency between Qazi and Connors, distinguishing Connors as being applicable only 
‘in relation to cases involving gipsies [sic]’.79 The Court of Appeal in Leeds considered that 
Connors could not be treated as simply identifying a discrete exception to the general rule 
propounded by the majority in Qazi and was therefore fundamentally inconsistent with it.
80
 
The conjoined appeal of Kay and Leeds divided the House of Lords on whether 
Connors was compatible with Qazi. The majority considered Connors to be no more than a 
narrow exception to the general rule laid down in Qazi
81
 and therefore essentially compatible 
with it. The minority considered Connors to reject the general rule laid down by Qazi.
82
 
Whichever view one prefers – and subsequent Strasbourg jurisprudence preferred the 
minority view
83
 – there was legitimate debate about whether or not Qazi and Connors were 
consistent. 
 The mooted inconsistency between Qazi and Connors was therefore not ‘clear’ at all. 
Lord Bingham’s claim is that the division of opinion over whether there was inconsistency 
between these cases illustrates the danger of departing from a precedent solely on the basis of 
a finding of clear inconsistency. This example does illustrate the existence of a category of 
cases in which reasonable but opposed views can be taken on whether or not there is an 
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inconsistency. But that example does nothing to deny the existence of a category of cases in 
which there can be no reasonable alternative to the conclusion that there is a clear 
inconsistency between a domestic case and subsequent Strasbourg jurisprudence. There are 
cases (to be examined below) that are more firmly in that category than the Berkshire case. 
These are cases where the domestic court has held that a specific Convention right is not 
engaged and the ECtHR later holds in relation to the same claim by the same parties that that 
Convention right is engaged. The likelihood that in other types of cases courts could 
reasonably disagree as to whether or not the domestic precedent is inconsistent with the 
Strasbourg decision is quite simply irrelevant to this type of case.  
 There is a further underlying issue. The ‘potential pitfalls’ of the lower courts too 
readily finding a clear inconsistency need to be balanced against the potential pitfalls of the 
lower courts being prevented from acting on a finding of clear inconsistency in cases where 
such a finding is as predictable as it is unassailable. The consequence of depriving the lower 
courts of the power to depart from a domestic precedent – which would, in any event, be 
inconsistent with any defensible justification of the doctrine of precedent – is that the only 
way that affected applicants can rely on their Convention rights is to take their claim to the 
Supreme Court or even the ECtHR itself. Such a course of action is both costly and threatens 
the protection of fundamental human rights that are supposed to be given domestic effect by 
the Human Rights Act. Leigh and Masterman poignantly ask why a person prevented from 
invoking his or her Convention rights by an incompatible domestic authority ‘must bear the 
burden, delay and cost of going to the higher court’.84 Such a conclusion, they argue, ‘runs 
directly counter to the scheme of the Act: Parliament has clearly decreed, through applying 
sections 2, 3 and 6 on all courts, that they have the task of bringing rights home’.85 I agree. It 
is my contention that sufficiently certain and predictable support for a finding of 
inconsistency exists when (a) a domestic appeal court explicitly declares a specific 
Convention right not to be engaged as part of its ratio, (b) the same claim by the same 
applicants is considered by the ECtHR and (c) the ECtHR explicitly declares that that 
Convention right is engaged. Such a case would provide stronger grounds for a finding of 
clear inconsistency than supported by the finding of inconsistency in East Berkshire, which 
Lord Bingham cited with approval. Lord Bingham’s conclusions must be interpreted 
accordingly, because a finding of clear inconsistency is unproblematic where those three 
conditions are satisfied. 
 
B. Constructive collaboration 
 
Lord Bingham offered a further, ‘more fundamental reason’ for the general need to adhere to 
the standard rules of precedent: 
 
The effective implementation of the Convention depends on constructive collaboration 
between the Strasbourg court and the national courts of member states. The Strasbourg court 
authoritatively expounds the interpretation of the [Convention] rights…, as it must if the 
Convention is to be uniformly understood by all member states. But in its decisions on 
particular cases the Strasbourg court accords a margin of appreciation, often generous, to the 
decisions of national authorities and attaches much importance to the peculiar facts of the 
case. Thus it is for national authorities, including national courts particularly, to decide in the 
first instance how the principles expounded in Strasbourg should be applied in the special 
context of national legislation, law, practice and social and other conditions. It is by the 
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decisions of national courts that the domestic standard must be initially set, and to those 
decisions the ordinary rules of precedent should apply.
86
 
 
When Lord Bingham says that the Strasbourg court ‘authoritatively expounds the 
interpretation’ of the Convention rights, we need to have regard to the fact that earlier in his 
speech he had explained that the ECtHR 
 
is the highest judicial authority on the interpretation of those rights, and the effectiveness of 
the Convention as an international instrument depends on the loyal acceptance by member 
states of the principles it lays down.
87
 
 
Thus, on matters concerning the application of the principles expounded in Strasbourg to 
particular facts, national courts are the initial decision-makers and have a margin of 
appreciation. According to Lord Bingham, however, the Strasbourg court is the ultimate 
authority on matters of principle concerning the scope and meaning of the Convention 
rights.
88
 It follows that this second line of reasoning does not support adherence to the rules 
of precedent where the Strasbourg court has authoritatively adopted a broader interpretation 
of a Convention right. To consider otherwise is to contradict the assertion that the Strasbourg 
court is the ultimate authority. 
 The general position of the Supreme Court and its predecessor to rulings of the 
ECtHR – the qualified mirror principle – was considered above. Lord Bingham’s reference to 
‘constructive collaboration’ in Kay surely means the same thing as Lord Phillips’ subsequent 
reference to ‘valuable dialogue’ in Horncastle and Lord Neuberger’s reference to  
‘constructive dialogue’ in Pinnock.89 As was shown above in section 3, the approach of the 
UK’s highest appeal court to this dialogue has been to take the ECtHR to have authoritatively 
ruled on the interpretation of a Convention right where it has done so in a ‘clear and constant’ 
line of cases or a contemporaneous decision of the Grand Chamber, save for special 
circumstances, such as where insufficient understanding of domestic law is displayed. Thus, 
the overarching principle of any ‘constructive collaboration’ is that the ECtHR is the 
‘ultimate authority’ on the scope and meaning of the Convention rights, and the ECtHR will 
be taken to have authoritatively ruled on the matter in the above circumstances. Lord 
Bingham’s appeal to the need for constructive collaboration is therefore not a sufficient 
reason to prevent lower courts from giving effect to subsequent decisions of the ECtHR 
falling within this overarching principle.  
 Lord Bingham’s reference to the principle of ‘constructive collaboration’ also needs 
to be interpreted in the light of his approval of the Court of Appeal’s decision in East 
Berkshire.
90
 The Court of Appeal in East Berkshire declined to follow the Bedfordshire 
case
91
 to give effect to the ECtHR’s decision in Z v UK.92 Lord Bingham did not make any 
special claim for Z v UK on Art 3 – it was not in fact a decision of the Grand Chamber and no 
consideration was given to whether it was part of a clear and constant line of cases. Instead, 
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his Lordship simply noted that ‘[n]o reference was made to the European Convention in any 
of the opinions’ in the Bedfordshire case.93 This implies that it is sometimes consistent with 
the need to maintain constructive collaboration to follow a decision of the ECtHR in 
preference to a domestic precedent even it if it is not a contemporaneous decision of the 
Grand Chamber or part of a clear and constant line of cases.  
 It is also important to again bear in mind the cost of reading Lord Bingham’s 
reasoning too restrictively on the ability of applicants to enforce their Convention rights in 
the domestic courts. The Supreme Court has repeatedly granted great weight to the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence and the recent case of Chester has reaffirmed the view that in some 
cases it will not regard it as appropriate to refuse to follow Strasbourg jurisprudence.
94
 
Holding the lower courts to a precedent that will almost certainly not be followed on appeal 
puts applicants in an artificially weak position in the lower courts. This can present a 
significant hurdle to the ability of applicants to enforce their Convention rights in the 
domestic courts and thereby bring their rights home. 
 The next section will focus on the situation where holding the lower courts to a 
domestic precedent presents a particular risk of artificially weakening the applicant’s 
position; namely, where the domestic precedent adopts a narrow interpretation of Art 8(1) 
and this is rejected in favour of a broader interpretation with respect to the same parties in 
Strasbourg.
95
 This situation arises in a context in which the ECtHR generally adopts a broad 
interpretation of para 1 of Arts 8–11 and a narrower interpretation of para 2. As the two cases 
to be examined in the next part illustrate, there is very little prospect of the Supreme Court 
continuing to support a narrower interpretation of para 1 in the face of subsequent ECtHR 
jurisprudence adopting a broader interpretation. In fact, the Supreme Court has consistently 
deferred to the ECtHR on the ambit of the Art 8(1) right to respect for private life, even 
where the case in question has yet to form a ‘clear and constant’ line of cases and is not a 
decision of the Grand Chamber. It is my contention that sections 2, 3 and 6 of the 1998 Act 
support a lower court in departing from a domestic precedent on Art 8(1) that will be 
considered to lack authority before the Supreme Court or the ECtHR. 
 
5. THE APPLICATION OF KAY IN SUBSEQUENT CASES 
 
In section 3 of this paper, it was argued that the doctrine of precedent cannot properly be 
understood as holding the lower courts to be strictly bound by precedent. It was further 
argued that deference to Strasbourg is most defensible in situations where what is at stake is 
the core of a Convention right, in the sense of the minimum protection guaranteed by it. In 
section 4, it was argued that the conclusion supported by the actual reasoning in Kay is much 
less restrictive than is suggested by the subsequent cases addressed in section 2. This section 
focuses on two of those subsequent cases: Purdy and GC.
96
  
 Above, it was argued that Lord Bingham’s reasoning does not support the view that a 
domestic precedent continues to carry significant authority where a subsequent decision of 
the ECtHR on the same facts reached a different decision and the decision of the ECtHR 
concerned the scope and meaning of a Convention right, at least in circumstances where the 
ECtHR’s decision was a contemporaneous decision of the Grand Chamber or represents a 
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‘clear and constant’ line of cases and there is no reasonable prospect of arguing that the 
Strasbourg court has misunderstood domestic law or procedure, or could otherwise be 
persuaded to depart from its decision. This conclusion does not require us to consider the 
House of Lords to have incorrectly (in terms of its own reasoning) declared that the lower 
courts should not have regarded the decision of the ECtHR in Connors as undermining the 
authority of Qazi. That is because Connors did not fall into the category of cases for which it 
must be concluded that the domestic precedent is inconsistent.  
What if, however, the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence is a single contemporaneous 
decision of the ECtHR, not a decision of the Grand Chamber, on the ambit of Art 8(1)? This 
is the very issue that arose in Purdy and GC. It will be argued that (contrary to the decisions 
in these cases) in such circumstances the lower courts should regard the domestic decision as 
non-binding and, in any event, leave to appeal should be granted where a lower court decides 
to follow a domestic precedent instead of the more recent and clearly inconsistent decision of 
the ECtHR. To hold otherwise where an applicant will thereby be prevented from engaging a 
Convention right is to inappropriately treat the domestic precedent as if it were strictly 
binding, fail to give proper consideration to the applicant’s Convention rights and invite 
defeat in the ECtHR. 
 
A.  Article 8 and assisted suicide 
 
In Purdy, the Divisional Court, Court of Appeal and then the House of Lords were faced with 
an apparent inconsistency between the decision of the Lords in R (Pretty) v Director of 
Public Prosecutions
97
 and the decision of the ECtHR in Pretty v UK.
98
 The lower courts 
regarded themselves as bound by the former and therefore denied that Ms Purdy’s 
Convention rights were even engaged. 
Both the domestic and Strasbourg decisions in Pretty had resulted from a claim 
brought by Mrs Pretty to the effect that her Art 8 right to private life was violated by the 
DPP’s failure to provide assurance that her husband would not be prosecuted for assisting her 
to commit suicide. The House of Lords explicitly held that Art 8(1) was not engaged. In the 
words of Lord Steyn, ‘article 8 prohibits interference with the way in which an individual 
leads his life and it does not relate to the manner in which he wishes to die’.99 If it had been 
engaged, the House of Lords ruled, the criminalisation of assisted suicide was justifiable 
under Art 8(2), as seeking to protect the rights of other vulnerable persons. The Strasbourg 
court ruled that the UK’s approach on the application of Art 8(2) fell within the margin of 
appreciation granted to States.
100
 It reached a different view, however, on Art 8(1). It did this 
by referring to the clear and constant jurisprudence to the effect that the concept of private 
life is a broad term lacking any exhaustive definition.
101
 Private life was said to cover the 
physical and psychological integrity of a person, be underlain by the notion of personal 
autonomy and give significance to ‘notions of the quality of life’.102 The Court indicated that 
it was ‘not prepared to exclude’ that preventing the exercise of a choice to avoid what Mrs 
Pretty considers to be undignified and distressing end to her life was an interference with her 
right to respect for private life as guaranteed under Art 8(1).
103
 Under the heading ‘The 
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Court’s Assessment’, the ECtHR then explicitly concluded that ‘[t]he Court has found above 
that the applicant’s rights under Art 8 of the Convention were engaged’.104 Further, in a later 
case, the ECtHR reaffirmed that the facts of Pretty fell within the ambit of Art 8.
105
 Thus, one 
would think that no reasonable interpretation of the decisions relating to Mrs Pretty could 
conclude that, on the issue of the engagement of Art 8(1), there was anything other than a 
clear inconsistency between the domestic precedent and the ECtHR. 
 Ms Purdy argued that the DPP’s failure to promulgate a specific policy outlining the 
circumstances in which a prosecution would be brought for assisting suicide violated her art 
8(1) right to private life. The key issue for the lower courts was whether the decision of the 
Lords in Pretty required the conclusion that under domestic law Ms Purdy’s predicament did 
not engage her Art 8(1) right. On no reasonable construction could the Pretty case be 
distinguished on this point, save perhaps in Ms Purdy’s favour. Both cases concerned the 
applicant’s interest in whether an identified third party would be prosecuted for assisting her 
to commit suicide. The cases could potentially be distinguished in Ms Purdy’s favour, 
because, as was later accepted by the House of Lords, Ms Purdy’s claim that her art 8(1) right 
was engaged was actually stronger than that of Mrs Pretty.
106
 Ms Purdy was requesting 
further information to enable her to make a decision about when to travel abroad to commit 
suicide, either now when she did not require assistance or later when she did; whereas Mrs 
Pretty was seeking an undertaking that her husband would be immune from prosecution for 
assisting her to commit suicide.  
The Divisional Court reached the conclusion that: 
 
the somewhat elliptical wording of the European Court at para 67 of Pretty [i.e. that it was 
‘not prepared to exclude’ that Art 8(1) was engaged] leaves us in considerable doubt about the 
extent to which the court might have disagreed with the House of Lords about the ambit of the 
rights created by Art 8(1).
107
 
 
Further, on the decision in Kay to require the lower courts to generally continue to follow a 
House of Lords decision that is inconsistent with a subsequent decision of the ECtHR: 
 
The exception is a very limited one that will apply only in the most exceptional 
circumstances. In our view Lord Bingham was leaving the door a chink ajar to cover 
unforeseeable but truly exceptional situations. The present case does not fall into that 
category. It is no more than a difference of opinion as to the ambit of Art 8(1) between the 
House of Lords and the ECtHR. There do not seem to us to be any additional factors of the 
kind envisaged by Lord Bingham in Kay.
108
 
 
With respect to Scott Baker LJ and Aikens J, neither conclusion is defensible for the reasons 
outlined above: to interpret Pretty v UK by reference to the elliptical wording of para 67 is to 
side-line the unequivocal wording of para 87 (and the general approach of the ECtHR in 
interpreting para 1 of Arts 8–11 widely and para 2 narrowly); and to interpret the exception in 
Kay so narrowly is to ignore the reasons offered by Lord Bingham for the general rule. 
 The Court of Appeal unreservedly disagreed with the Divisional Court’s interpretation 
of Pretty v UK and reached the ‘unequivocal’ conclusion that the decision of the House of 
Lords was therefore clearly inconsistent with the decision of the ECtHR.
109
 Its interpretation 
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of Kay was, however, just as narrow, concluding that the exception to the requirement to 
continue to follow a decision of the House of Lords was confined to ‘the very exceptional 
case, one of an extreme character, or of wholly exceptional circumstances’.110 The Court of 
Appeal therefore held that as a matter of domestic law Art 8(1) was not engaged where a 
person contemplated seeking assistance to commit suicide to avoid what she considers to be 
an undignified and distressing end to her life. The Court of Appeal did concede that ‘it is 
highly unlikely that the House of Lords will not bow to a decision of Strasbourg on the 
question of the engagement of Art 8(1) if the matter should fall to be considered by them’.111 
Despite this, the Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal!
112
 This decision to deny leave to 
appeal is difficult to reconcile with the recommendation of Lord Bingham in Kay that when 
concluding that there is inconsistency with a Strasbourg authority the lower court ‘may 
express their views and give leave to appeal…[and thereby] discharge their duty under the 
1998 Act’.113 
 Lord Hope, giving the leading judgment of the House of Lords, thought it ‘plain’ that 
the ECtHR had found Art 8(1) to be engaged
114
 and  
 
it is obvious that the interests of human rights would not be well served if the House were to 
regard itself as bound by a previous decision as to the meaning or effect of a Convention right 
which was shown to be inconsistent with a subsequent decision in Strasbourg. Otherwise the 
House would be at risk of endorsing decisions which are incompatible with Convention rights.
115
 
 
Yet, his Lordship declared, the Court of Appeal had been right to follow the decision of the 
House of Lords in Pretty because ‘[n]o other course was open to it’ in the light of Kay and 
RJM.
116
 His Lordship did not comment on the denial of leave to appeal. 
 I contend that the appeal courts were correct to conclude that Pretty v UK had held 
Art 8(1) to be engaged. Once that conclusion is accepted as manifestly clear, there can be no 
grounds for denying that the decisions of the House of Lords and the ECtHR were clearly 
inconsistent. The case for this conclusion is at least as strong as the case for clear 
inconsistency accepted in East Berkshire, as once again the two cases had involved the same 
parties. 
It is distinctly problematic that all three courts restrictively applied a narrow 
interpretation of Kay and, even more so, that the Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal 
without criticism from the House of Lords. In Pretty v UK, the ECtHR was undoubtedly 
addressing an issue of principle of the type for which the House of Lords and Supreme Court 
has consistently deferred to the ECtHR. The issue was one of interpretation of a Convention 
right: whether or not Art 8(1) is engaged where a person contemplates seeking assistance 
when committing suicide to avoid what she considers to be an undignified and distressing end 
to her life. This is an issue concerning the scope of a Convention right, rather than its 
application in the context of domestic law.
117
 On this point, Pretty v UK could in no way be 
said to have overlooked a crucial aspect of domestic law or otherwise lack authority. The 
House of Lords must therefore be correct to conclude that, even though Pretty v UK was the 
first decision of its type, ‘the interests of human rights’ required it to depart from its previous 
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decision and to have decided otherwise would present the clear risk of endorsement of 
decisions that ‘are incompatible with Convention rights’. Why, however, does this reasoning 
not apply equally to the Court of Appeal? Why is it acceptable for the interests of human 
rights to be frustrated and for the Court of Appeal to endorse decisions that are incompatible 
with Convention rights? Lord Hope is surely providing a rationale for the conclusion that the 
ECtHR can sometimes reach a sufficiently authoritative conclusion even when it has not sat 
as the Grand Chamber or had the opportunity to establish a clear and constant line of case 
law. Even if this is considered to go too far, which Lord Hope’s endorsement of the Court of 
Appeal’s approach to precedent implies, this reasoning supports the view that leave to appeal 
in this case should not have been refused by the Court of Appeal. Treating leave as 
discretionary in this case ran counter to Lord Bingham’s reasoning, because in no sense did 
the Court of Appeal’s approach facilitate certainty and constructive collaboration between the 
domestic courts and Strasbourg. 
 
B.  Article 8 and the retention of fingerprints and DNA samples 
 
In GC, the Divisional Court and then the Supreme Court were faced with a clear 
inconsistency between the decision of the House of Lords and the ECtHR in S & Marper.
118
 
 S & Marper concerned two separate applicants. S had been charged with attempted 
robbery but subsequently acquitted, and Marper had been charged with harassment but the 
case against him had been discontinued. In both cases, they complained that retention of their 
fingerprints and DNA samples under the relevant domestic legislation violated their Art 8 
right. The House of Lords held that Art 8(1) was not engaged (Baroness Hale dissenting),
119
 
but, if it was, the retention of fingerprints and DNA samples was justified under Art 8(2) as 
necessary for the prevention of crime and the protection of the rights of others.
120
 The same 
parties brought an application before the ECtHR, which held that the retention of fingerprints 
and samples did engage Art 8
121
 and the ‘blanket and indiscriminate nature of the powers of 
retention…fails to strike a fair balance’ and the UK had therefore ‘overstepped any 
acceptable margin of appreciation’.122 
  GC & C concerned two separate applicants whose fingerprints and DNA samples 
were taken and retained after the cases against them had been discontinued. They complained 
that the indefinite retention of their data was an interference with their Art 8 rights to respect 
for private life and could not be justified under Art 8(2). In the Divisional Court, the 
applicants focussed on the issue of precedent and whether the court was bound by the 
decision of the House of Lords.
123
 The Divisional Court concluded – and on this there could 
be no reasonable debate – that there was a clear inconsistency between the decision of the 
House of Lords and the ECtHR in S & Marper.
124
 The Court further ruled, following Kay, 
that it was nonetheless bound by the decision of the House of Lords on the basis of the 
‘doctrine of precedent and…legal certainty’.125 This view treats precedents as if they are 
strictly binding, which we have seen they cannot be. 
 Moses LJ, with the agreement of Wyn Williams J, went on to express a view on the 
exception to the rule in Kay: 
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In the next paragraph Lord Bingham identified what he described as ‘one partial exception’. 
That single exception is miles away from this case. It relates to a decision made before the 
introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998, in circumstances where the policy which applied 
to that decision had been largely eroded and where it was accepted that the previous decision 
was not good law. The subject [sic.] of that decision were the same children whose claims 
succeeded Strasbourg and who had recovered substantial reparation.
126
 
 
His Lordship declared that the fact that the parties were the same was only one consideration 
in Kay and, in the case before the Divisional Court, the fact that the inconsistent cases 
involved the same parties afforded no ground for failing to follow the decision of the House 
of Lords in S & Marper.
127
 Moses LJ thereby sought to treat Lord Bingham as laying down a 
set of necessary conditions for the operation of the exception, namely: 
 
(a) the domestic precedent was decided before the introduction of the 1998 Act; 
(b) the policy considerations applied in the domestic decision had been eroded and were 
accepted as no longer good law; and 
(c) the same parties who lost in the domestic case succeeded in Strasbourg. 
 
With respect, such a narrow reading of the exception ignores the reasons offered by Lord 
Bingham for the general rule. The analysis presented above offers an alternative explanation 
of why the Berkshire case represents an exception. Condition (c) represents an instance where 
it cannot reasonably be doubted that there is a clear inconsistency between the previous 
decisions. Conditions (a) and (b) represent an instance where the need for ‘constructive 
collaboration’ between the domestic and Strasbourg courts does not support adherence to the 
domestic precedent. More specifically, condition (a) indicates (at least where the Convention 
rights are not even mentioned) that the domestic court did not fully address the applicant’s 
Convention rights and condition (b) indicates that the Strasbourg hearing does not display a 
misunderstanding of English law. Thus, the conditions summarised by Moses LJ represent 
sufficient conditions for departure from an earlier domestic precedent, but not necessary 
conditions for such. 
 Having reached the (in my view problematic) conclusion that it was bound by the 
decision of the House of Lords in Marper, the Divisional Court did permit a leapfrog appeal. 
Interestingly, the Court expressed itself consistently with the view that it had an obligation to 
do so by concluding that the: 
 
appropriate course that I would take is that which is indicated in the speech of Lord Bingham, 
namely, that this court should give permission to appeal and order a leapfrog appeal to which 
I should record both the defendant and the Secretary of State have specifically accented.
128
 
 
 When the case reached the Supreme Court, no mention was made of the issue of 
precedent or the use of the leapfrog procedure. Indeed, the arguments before the Supreme 
Court focused entirely on the appropriate relief or remedy, because it was common ground 
that, in the light of S & Marper in the ECtHR, the previous decision of the House of Lords on 
Art 8 could not stand.
129
 Once again, a single contemporaneous decision of the Strasbourg 
court was treated as authoritative because it decided a matter of principle concerned with the 
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scope of Art 8(1), did not display misunderstanding of domestic law or any other defect 
suggesting that it was not a carefully considered judgment, and was not distinguishable on the 
facts of the subsequent domestic case. As before, the highest domestic appeal court did not 
consider it necessary to invoke the 1966 Practice Statement before disregarding its previous 
decision on the basis that it was sufficient under s 2 that the ECtHR had taken a different 
approach on the scope of a Convention right. This continues to stand in contrast to the 
approach adopted by the highest appeal court when it departs from its previous decisions for 
other reasons.
130
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has re-examined the relationship between stare decisis and the statutory duty to 
take account of Strasbourg jurisprudence. It has been argued that the case law on this issue 
implausibly suggests that precedents can be strictly binding and gives too much weight to 
domestic precedents that are inconsistent with subsequent decisions of the ECtHR. 
Interpreting Lord Bingham’s leading judgment in Kay by reference to the reasons that he 
offered to support his conclusions implies a much less restrictive position than has been 
adopted in subsequent cases. The upshot is that the lower courts should be far more ready to 
depart from domestic precedents that rely on narrow interpretations of Convention rights that 
will no longer hold sway with the Supreme Court or ECtHR, and must be prepared to grant 
leave to appeal when they decide not to follow this course of action. Anything less than this is 
simply not a defensible attempt to give effect to the doctrine of precedent in the light of the 
1998 Act. 
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